Making Sense of Geithner's Plan

Man there are a lot of people lining up against Tim Geithner's plan for ridding the financial system of 'toxic assets'. Of course people have lampooned that Geithner has changed the name to 'legacy assets', though I thought this was smart public relations. It might sound silly but rebranding works.

I don't like Geithner as the head of the Treasurery Department, he is not up too the job, which requires more than an understanding of the financial system. And I do think that Obama should have other voices on his economic team.

However I think that some critics of the new plan are confusing their dislike of Geithner with his plan. Not all, I think Professor Krugman brings up some relavent areas of concern, but on the whole, I am more optimistic of this plan than many.

One question I have heard is why is the Obama administration going with this plan, my uninformed opinion is the Obam administration is trying to avoid anything that requires legislative action. Lets face it, nothing coming out of Congress has any real chance of fixing this mess.

The main components of Treasury Secretary Geithner’s new PPIP to price and remove toxic assets from banks’ balance sheets are as follows:

Here are the Basic Principles of the Plan: Treasury will use $75bn - $100bn in TARP money to co-invest alongside private sector participants and the FDIC as well as the Federal Reserve, to buy $500bn to $1 trillion of toxic mortgage assets (both residential and commercial) off banks’ books ('toxic assets' I mean ‘legacy assets’)

There are two separate approaches that Geithner has for legacy loans and for legacy securities. At first, Treasury will share its $75-100bn equity stake equally between the two programs with the option to shift the bulk of financing towards the option with the greater promise of success with market participants.

1) Public-Private Program for Legacy Loans: The FDIC is going to establish several public-private investment funds whose sole purpose will be to purchase and hold specific loan pools put up for sale by banks (large and small). The transaction price will be established by the highest bid at an auction run by the FDIC, in which a wide array of institutional investors and even individuals with a long-term orientation are encouraged to participate. The liabilities of the investment fund consist of an equity stake (50% of which provided by auction winner, 50% from Treasury TARP), and collateralized debt issued by the investment fund and guaranteed by the FDIC to finance the remainder of the purchase price (FDIC gets guarantee fee). Before the auction, the FDIC specifies the pool-specific debt-to-equity ratio it is willing to guarantee subject to a maximum 6-to-1 leverage ratio. The private investor would then manage the servicing of the asset pool - using asset managers approved and supervised by the FDIC - until disposal or maturity.

Example: Assuming a 6-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio, the highest bid for a loan pool with $100 face value might turn out to be $84. Of this amount, the FDIC would provide $72 in debt guarantees whereas the equity stake of $12 would be shared equally between the auction winner ($6) and the Treasury ($6).

2) Legacy Securities Program: The legacy securities program is to be incorporated into the Term Asset-Backed Securities Facility (TALF) whose original goal was to provide collateralized financing (non-recourse loans) to buyers of newly created consumer loan/small business loan ABS. Under the Legacy Securities Program, the eligible collateral for TALF is extended to include non-agency RMBS that were originally rated AAA and outstanding CMBS and ABS that are rated AAA.

Example: Under the Legacy Securities Program, up to five Treasury-approved fund managers will have a period of time to raise private capital to target the purchase of designated securities. Assuming the fund manager is able to raise $100 of private capital for the fund, Treasury will provide $100 equity co-investment alongside private investors. Treasury will then provide a $100 loan to the public-private investment fund. Moreover, Treasury may also choose to provide an additional loan of up to $100 to the fund. The investment fund then has $300-$400 at its disposal to buy legacy securities at its discretion. As a purchaser of TALF-eligible securities, the PPIF would also have access to the expanded TALF program of collateralized Fed loans when it is launched.

Assessment

The main sticking points in previous market-based approaches to clear toxic assets from banks’ books were threefold:

a) How to value illiquid assets?

b) Once a transaction price is established, will banks be willing to sell and take a hair cut?

c) How to induce private investors to purchase legacy assets without unduly wasting taxpayer money?

a) Valuation of Illiquid Assets

The theoretical foundations of Geithner’s plan are provided by Lucian Bebchuk from Harvard University among others. He explains that “if the underlying market failure is at least partly one of liquidity, an effective plan for a public-private partnership in buying troubled assets can be designed. The key is to have competition at two levels.First, at the level of buying troubled assets, the government’s program should focus on establishing many competing funds that are privately managed and partly funded with private capital-- and not creating one, large "aggregator bank"-- funded with public and private capital and engaging in purchasing troubled assets. Second, several potential fund managers should compete for government capital under a market mechanism resulting in maximum participation of private capital and minimum costs to taxpayers.”
Geithner’s plan seems to follow these guidelines to a large degree. In particular, on the one hand the government subsidy allows private investors to bid a higher price than otherwise warranted (i.e. the government gives investors the equivalent of a call option.) On the other hand, the fact that the private investor is bound to lose its entire equity stake if the asset value deteriorates from artificially high valuations provides an incentive to bid conservatively. Both effects together may contribute to a reasonable level of price discovery. In case of the securities program, the prospect of refinancing purchased legacy securities with TALF via a non-recourse loan (which is the equivalent of a put option) should incentivize private investors to bid higher than otherwise warranted.

b) Will banks participate?

A similar purely private solution to get toxic assets off banks’ balance sheets was tried with Paulson’s aborted Super-SIV when legacy assets were still marked substantially higher than at present. It became clear then that the private sector will require a possibly substantial taxpayer subsidy in order to overcome the collective action paralysis. Indeed, in the case of the legacy loan example outlined in the Geithner plan with a 6/1 leverage, private investors that invest 7.1% (=1/7 * 0.5) of the equity will get 50% of any upside in return. While Treasury will also share in any upside by half, any downside beyond the private investors’ equity stake is clearly borne by the taxpayers.

While this subsidy to investors provides a powerful incentive to bid prices up in a competitive auction, banks stuck with particularly toxic assets or thin capital buffers may still find a potential writedown at market-clearing prices prohibitive and some might need to be recapitalized after taking the hair cut. FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair has already warned that while this plan will help many solvent banks get rid of their toxic assets thus clearing the way for new loans and fresh capital some banks are beyond the stage of rescue. Those borderline insolvent banks will likely require an additional incentive to sell or mandatory participation otherwise they will prefer to hold on to their assets, especially in view of the FASB’s prospective easing of mark-to-market accounting rules.

For the sake completeness, some commentators would also like to see better safeguards established in order to prevent banks and asset managers from potentially colluding in their common interest to the detriment of the taxpayer.

c) And taxpayers?

At the end of the day the performance of the toxic legacy assets is driven by the cash flow performance of the underlying loans. Keep in mind that among subprime borrowers, serious delinquencies and foreclosures have affected about 20% of outstanding loans as of December 2008 thus impairing the cash flow directed to junior RMBS investors and/or ABS CDOs consisting of these junior tranches. While ABX prices responded positively to the prospect of increased buyer interest, the ultimate loan value will depend on whether households and commercial real estate borrowers will continue making payments in the future. More on that below.

As a practical example of the performance of a toxic portfolio, take the Fed’s Maiden Lane portfolio with Bear Stearns assets. Cumberland Advisors reported that so far the results aren’t promising, and they see no prospect for a profit on the assets. In fact, the portfolio has lost over 10% of its value, and losses are mounting. At present, losses on that portfolio exceed $4.5 billion and the taxpayers’ share is now $3.5 billion. Others point to the low recovery value of IndyMac’s mortgage portfolio as a benchmark.


Bottom line: Will it get credit flowing again?

The immediate market reaction (equities and investment grade CDS staged a substantial rally, less so high yield CDS) was clearly one of relief that nationalization seems to be off the table for now and that the administration is committed to market-based solutions. While the extent of the guarantees almost makes one wonder why the involvement of the private sector is needed in the first place, it is the involvement of the private sector that creates a context in which price setting and discovery happen based on a market mechanism.

An important question at this point is: What should we look at while assessing the plan in the months ahead?

Clearly the unfreeze of credit markets would be the first sign of success but we might not see this happening before some time. Some of the banks that choose to sell assets and take a writedown might be in need of additional capital before they can resume lending. Also, for those institutions that are beyond the stage of rescue and effectively insolvent, the plan will likely not be as effective in stimulating lending or participation in the first place.

The increase in the supply of credit that will come from institutions that are solvent will be important, but will demand be there to do its part? If the real side of the economy continues to deteriorate, it is likely that credit demand might be subdued. Moreover, a further continued deterioration on the real side of the economy would imply new defaults on credit cards, consumer loans, auto loans and mortgages that would result in new toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions recreating an environment where banks would maintain stringent lending standards. Therefore, the success of the plan is a necessary but not sufficient condition to get the economy back on a recovery path. The success of the fiscal stimulus package in sustaining aggregate demand and minimizing job losses and the success in restarting demand in the housing sector will be instrumental to put a stop to the negative feedback loop between the real and the financial side of the economy.

Moreover, if the negative feedback loop persists, need for further funding will arise. While it will be very challenging to obtain Congress approval for additional TARP money, we should point out that the government has set aside an additional $750bn in the FY2010 budget in aid for the financial sector.

Hence, taking care of legacy loans and securities is a welcome step forward, especially for solvent institutions whose asset values are subject to a substantial liquidity discount. However, insolvent institutions might not find as much relief from this plan, and the impact of the plan on the real economy might not be enough to pull the economy out of a contraction for good part of this year and sluggish growth thereafter. But by conducting auctions and determining the market value of the toxic assets, the Treasury will be implicitly using the private sector to ‘stress test’ the financial system to determine which banks are insolvent and therefore will need further government intervention.

Just for Fun: Tim Geithner's New Plan

Tim Geithner has become a national joke, and that means Saturday Night Live just has to lampoon him. The trouble with the plan laid out in this skit is that it might actually be Tim Geithner's plan. Great cold opening to this week's show.

Watch it here:

LibertyAir Blog

Paul Krugman: The Big Dither

Paul Krugman writes today in the New York Times about the need to fix America’s banks. Professor Krugman asks the question if President Obama is being bold enough, or is he and his administration dithering too much?

I do think that Obama has been slow in the steps that are necessary to fix the banking mess, but I do wonder if the President is constrained by politics, and the need to keep the markets some what calm. I think Krugman brings up great points, and as an academic and a pundit Professor Krugman provides a strong progressive argument. It is not his job to worry about the politics, but to suggest the best course from an economic sense.

The Big Dither
By PAUL KRUGMAN

Last month, in his big speech to Congress, President Obama argued for bold steps to fix America’s dysfunctional banks. “While the cost of action will be great,” he declared, “I can assure you that the cost of inaction will be far greater, for it could result in an economy that sputters along for not months or years, but perhaps a decade.”

Many analysts agree. But among people I talk to there’s a growing sense of frustration, even panic, over Mr. Obama’s failure to match his words with deeds. The reality is that when it comes to dealing with the banks, the Obama administration is dithering. Policy is stuck in a holding pattern.

Here’s how the pattern works: first, administration officials, usually speaking off the record, float a plan for rescuing the banks in the press. This trial balloon is quickly shot down by informed commentators.

Then, a few weeks later, the administration floats a new plan. This plan is, however, just a thinly disguised version of the previous plan, a fact quickly realized by all concerned. And the cycle starts again.

Why do officials keep offering plans that nobody else finds credible? Because somehow, top officials in the Obama administration and at the Federal Reserve have convinced themselves that troubled assets, often referred to these days as “toxic waste,” are really worth much more than anyone is actually willing to pay for them — and that if these assets were properly priced, all our troubles would go away.
Thus, in a recent interview Tim Geithner, the Treasury secretary, tried to make a distinction between the “basic inherent economic value” of troubled assets and the “artificially depressed value” that those assets command right now. In recent transactions, even AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities have sold for less than 40 cents on the dollar, but Mr. Geithner seems to think they’re worth much, much more.
And the government’s job, he declared, is to “provide the financing to help get those markets working,” pushing the price of toxic waste up to where it ought to be.
What’s more, officials seem to believe that getting toxic waste properly priced would cure the ills of all our major financial institutions. Earlier this week, Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, was asked about the problem of “zombies” — financial institutions that are effectively bankrupt but are being kept alive by government aid. “I don’t know of any large zombie institutions in the U.S. financial system,” he declared, and went on to specifically deny that A.I.G. — A.I.G.! — is a zombie.
This is the same A.I.G. that, unable to honor its promises to pay off other financial institutions when bonds default, has already received $150 billion in aid and just got a commitment for $30 billion more.

The truth is that the Bernanke-Geithner plan — the plan the administration keeps floating, in slightly different versions — isn’t going to fly.

Take the plan’s latest incarnation: a proposal to make low-interest loans to private investors willing to buy up troubled assets. This would certainly drive up the price of toxic waste because it would offer a heads-you-win, tails-we-lose proposition. As described, the plan would let investors profit if asset prices went up but just walk away if prices fell substantially.

But would it be enough to make the banking system healthy? No.

Think of it this way: by using taxpayer funds to subsidize the prices of toxic waste, the administration would shower benefits on everyone who made the mistake of buying the stuff. Some of those benefits would trickle down to where they’re needed, shoring up the balance sheets of key financial institutions. But most of the benefit would go to people who don’t need or deserve to be rescued.

And this means that the government would have to lay out trillions of dollars to bring the financial system back to health, which would, in turn, both ensure a fierce public outcry and add to already serious concerns about the deficit. (Yes, even strong advocates of fiscal stimulus like yours truly worry about red ink.) Realistically, it’s just not going to happen.

So why has this zombie idea — it keeps being killed, but it keeps coming back — taken such a powerful grip? The answer, I fear, is that officials still aren’t willing to face the facts. They don’t want to face up to the dire state of major financial institutions because it’s very hard to rescue an essentially insolvent bank without, at least temporarily, taking it over. And temporary nationalization is still, apparently, considered unthinkable.

But this refusal to face the facts means, in practice, an absence of action. And I share the president’s fears: inaction could result in an economy that sputters along, not for months or years, but for a decade or more.

The truth is the Bernanke-Geithner plan will not work and I hope President Obama soon realizes this, and makes the changes that are necessary to fix this country.

Bankers Don't Care About the Banks

I am a huge fan of the Young Turks and wanted to point out this must-read piece that their host Cenk Uygar wrote:

Tim Geithner and Larry Summers and many others are missing the fundamental flaw in the system. The bankers don't care about the banks; they care about the
bankers.

These days, the way executives make money instead is in the form of bonuses for years where they bring in a lot of return (and often times for years they don't), but the threat of being fired for too much risk taking is minimal. The more risk you take, the more money everyone makes. And it's not the partner's money you're playing with anymore. You're playing with house money. No one is minding the store anymore.

So, now we have Tim Geithner and the rest of Treasury working so hard to prop up not just these failed banks - but these failed bank executives - because we don't want government running these large companies. The self-interest of the market will do a better job of managing these companies. But it hasn't - because of this fundamental flaw.

These executives did not actually fail. They succeeded wildly. It's just that they had a different goal - to take home as much money as they possibly could for themselves. Mission accomplished!

The Treasury plan is all wrong. We have to first acknowledge that the boards of these companies are not truly representing the shareholders. They are largely friends with most of the CEOs and they do not have an incentive to reign in out of control compensation for the top executives. Then those CEOs pass on the wrong incentives to the executives below them. The more risk they all take, the more money they take home. And if their company goes broke one day - who cares?

Most of these guys took home millions upon millions of dollars already for profits that never really existed. If the company goes under, okay the gravy train came to an end but they still have all the money they made from all those years. It's in their personal bank accounts. That's enlightened self-interest!

Do you know that last year, as Merrill Lynch was in its death throes, 696 executives got bonuses over a million dollars? 696! As the company lost tens of billions of dollars, the executives took home a combined $3.6 billion that year. Billions in bonuses in the worst year in the company's history. They're not stupid; they're smart. They're looting the store before the cops show up.

This is the financial equivalent of the federal government not showing up to rescue people after Hurricane Katrina. Last year the five biggest Wall Street securities firms lost $25.3 billion. The executives at those companies still took home $26 billion in bonuses. In other words, they wouldn't have lost a nickel if they hadn't taken any bonuses.

The Treasury Department still hasn't shown up to take over these looted stores. In fact, they keep pouring taxpayer money into these same shops, as the money continues to move out the back door. Tim Geithner is the worst sheriff in the world.
But we already knew that. Because the main guy who was overseeing all of these banks in New York, as they took these giants risks, was the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York - Tim Geithner.

He is under the misimpression that his job is to protect the sanctity of the banks.
Not only is that not his job, but that is working against his actual goal. His real job is to stabilize the financial system, with or without these particular banks or bank executives. The longer he keeps these guys in charge, the longer the looting continues.

Obama's Biggest Mistake

President Obama made a huge mistake during the transition period leading up to his assuming the presidencey of the United States, and it was naming Tim Geithner as the Treasurey Secretary. Geithner just is not the right man to be head of the US Treasurey as the world slips towards a second Great Depression.

Tim Geithner just does not seem to have the creativity to deal with the economic mess that this nation is facing. He seems committed to the view that banks should never be saved by the government, and no matter what they should stay private even if they’re bankrupt, because — well because. Geithner seems incapable of envisioning a government run solution, which is okay, except he is one of the men in charge of developing the government's solution. I believe that Geithner has tunnel vision which prevents him from trying to devise a policy which assumes that the many of the assets in the banking system are “bad,” and need to be removed from the system.

My question is how long does President Obama stick with Tim Geithner as the Treasurey Secretary? Can Geithner turn it around at Treasurey? How long can we wait to find out?

Why Geithner's Plan was a Dud

You might remember that last week Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner delivered a much anticipated speech on the next steps Treasury would be taking to bring stability back to the financial and banking sectors.

It bombed.

The question was why?

There were many who thought maybe President Obama had erred in selecting Geithner for this role, and to be honest I wondered it myself.

Geithner's plan as he presented in a live speech and press conference lacked details, and the Secretary looked scared. He made pronouncements about elements of the plan, but then said that we'd learn about the details eventually. Investors were not impressed, and the markets fell hard and quickly.

The question again was why? It turns out that Geithner decided late in the process that the plan he'd been working on was not going to work. So at the last moment he scrapped it entirely. Once the Treasury secretary and his team realized they would need a different approach, they had to decide how to present a plan that was still coming together. As they saw it, the Bush administration had a habit of presenting plans with details they had no intention of sticking to, which didn't exactly inspire confidence. Geithner preferred to "disappoint the markets with vagueness than lay out a lot of details they might have to change later."

At the same time the Treasurey Department has a shortage of personnel. To date, President Obama has not nominated any assistant secretaries or undersecretaries at Treasury, and the handful of mid-level staffers who have started work are still finding their offices and getting their building passes and BlackBerrys.

In addition Geithner and his team made a strategic decision to limit input from the financial industry and other outsiders, aiming to prevent leaks and avoid a perception they were designing the plan for the benefit of big banks. But that also meant they were unable to vet their plan with the companies involved or set realistic expectations of what would be announced.

All this combined to lead to the flop last week. Lets hope the extra time helps them to get a better plan, which can actually succeed.

Geithner's Plan Falls Flat

Yesterday Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner presented the Obama’s administration’s Financial Stability Plan to deal with the financial system’s toxic asset overhang and ease, if not reverse, the ongoing decline in bank lending to households and corporations.

To say that it went over like a lead balloon would be an understatement.

Out of the three broad strategies that most economists say are available - nationalization, ‘good / bad bank’, backstop guarantee on ring-fenced toxic assets - the administration plan offers elements of all three.

I am always wary of a plan that offers a little bit of everything.

Geithner’s first program involves a mandatory ‘stress test’ for all banks with $100bn-plus assets which should also shed some clarity on the individual banks exposures and valuations of toxic assets. This I like because there is still too much we do not know about the financial crisis. A major part of this whole economic meltdown has been fear of the unknown. Safe investments and secure loans have been damaged by fear of toxic assets.

According to the plan Geithner laid out yesterday, after the stress test the Treasury’s Capital Assistance Program would stand ready with preferred shares / warrants injections where needed, only this time with clear lending requirements and strict limits on dividends, stock repurchases and acquisitions next to a $500,000 compensation cap. This solves some of the problems with the original $350 billion that Paulson injected into the financial markets late last year.

Geithner claims that any capital investments made by Treasury under the CAP would be placed in the Financial Stability Trust. However, Geithner left unclear what other options are there for institutions that are severely undercapitalized or fail to attract public capital on a recurring basis (Bank of America and Citigroup are two examples) Yes the program aims at ensuring that there is full transparency disclosing all relevant information on capital recipients at www.FinancialStability.gov; but is that enough to give Geithner our trust?

The second program Geithner spoke about was the Public-Private Investment Fund (PPP). This program aims at setting up a new lending/guarantee facility (the so called Bad Bank solution). This program would work by leveraging an initial private capital commitment with government funds to an initial scale of up to $500 billion (and if you look at the fine print it can be expanded to a maximum of $1 trillion.) The aim of this idea is to involve private capital on a large scale that sits currently on the sidelines while also allowing private market forces to determine the price for currently troubled and illiquid assets.

Personally I think yesterday’s tanking of the Dow was because Geithner mentioned using private capitol in his plan.

A similar experiment was tried before with the private sector sponsored M-LEC vehicle that ultimately proved unviable due to asymmetric toxic asset exposures of participating banks and due to still unresolved asset valuation issues. Commentators agree that for a similar plan to work this time, the government will have to assume a potentially substantial downside in order to induce otherwise unwilling investors to participate in view of the size of potential losses.

Renowned distressed debt experts such as Edward Altman and Martin Fridson note that the best time to invest in distressed debt is when default rates peak. Mind that high-yield default rates are set to rise to 15-20% sometime in 2010 from currently 4-5% due to very bad credit quality at the outset of the cycle.

Yet this again is putting all the risk on the public and all the reward for those who got us in this message.

The third program put forth by Secretary Geithner is an expanded version of the previously $200bn Federal Reserve Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program aimed at unclogging the markets for auto, student and other consumer loans. That initiative may expand to as much as $1 trillion, using $100 billion from the Treasury's rescue funds, and include aid for commercial real estate markets.

Geithner points out that securitization created about 40% of the demand for new loans extended to consumers, students, and auto buyers. The decline of securitized lending to the tune of $1.2 trillion between 2006 and 2008 leaves a hole that needs to be filled if a severe lending contraction should be prevented.

Economist Nouriel Roubini in his latest writing It Is Time to Nationalize Insolvent Banking Systems argues that, ultimately, nationalization may be a more market friendly solution of a banking crisis: it creates the biggest hit for common and preferred shareholders of clearly insolvent institutions and – possibly – even the unsecured creditors in case the bank insolvency is too large; it provides a fair upside to the tax-payer. Moreover, it bypasses the asset valuation issue as any overpayment goes back into taxpayers pockets. “With the government starting stress tests to figure out which institutions are so massively undercapitalized that they need to be taken over by the FDIC the administration is putting in place the steps for the eventual and necessary takeover of the insolvent banks.” This might well explain some of the negative market reaction.

The Treasury has stressed that while the ongoing price correction will stimulate home demand, there is a need to reduce foreclosures, which otherwise adding to the excess overhang of homes pose the risk of price over-correction, pushing more homeowners into negative equity. The Treasury plans to announce a Housing Program in the next few weeks to help refinance mortgages and contain foreclosures by reducing monthly payments for homeowners. The program will be financed by using $50 billion from the remaining TARP funds. To increase lender participation, the plan makes it compulsory for banks using government funds under the Financial Stability Plan to participate in foreclosure mitigation. In order to stimulate home demand and help the current homeowners refinance, the Treasury and Fed will continue with their November 2008 plans use $600 billion to buy MBSs and debt of the GSEs using and reduce mortgage rates to the 4-4.5% range. More importantly, the plan will increase flexibility to modify loans under the Hope Now and FHA Programs started in 2007-08 to help increase participation and foreclosure prevention.

Efforts to stimulate demand reducing mortgage rates and offering tax incentives will be largely ineffective as they are a small factor in determining home demand relative to factors such as tighter lending standards, changing dynamics for households - job and income loss, wealth erosion, rising savings rate, and low expectations of income or asset appreciation. These factors will constrain home demand in the short run while potential buyers await further price correction and banks don’t see the viability in offering mortgage for a house whose value is expected to fall.

As a result, the government needs to focus on the supply side of the market by refinancing at-risk mortgages and preventing foreclosures that will only add to the existing overhang of houses. Moreover, government’s loan modification program should reduce mortgage principal rather than just reducing the mortgage rate or extending the loan maturity, which has been the case in past government programs. Unless the problem of insolvency among a large number of households is addressed, default on modified mortgages will also continue. Also, given the large number of homeowners with negative home equity, the program will need much larger funds - over $600 billion to $1 trillion though the actual cost might be much less, since the government will receive a share from future home appreciation. Monetary incentives for servicers are also low and ineffective. Even the number of homeowners the program plans to target, 1.5-2 million is a very small fraction of the over 12 million homeowners with negative equity. In fact, several Democrats are pushing a legislation to allow bankruptcy judges to change mortgage terms that would allow lenders to reduce the mortgage principal for primary homes and bring down monthly payments. To increase participation, they support offering monetary incentives for servicers while lenders will be entitled to a share if the homeowner sells the house and also have the government share any losses on the modified mortgage.

Looking at the shortcomings of past government programs such as the Hope Now, Housing Retention and FDIC programs, the new program should be mandatory for lenders in order to increase participation.

The government will also need to share the cost of modifying the loan, by matching the principal or the interest rate cut in a proportionate or less than proportionate amount. By guaranteeing the loans, the government will be the senior debt holder. The new interest rate should be based on the risk assessment of the borrower and all three parties – homeowner, lenders and servicers, and the government should share the cost of modification. However, determining the extent of principal reduction based on the true value of the house, and dealing with second lien mortgages and the diverging interests of mortgage servicers will be challenging.

Under the new guidelines for compensation issued by the Treasury, firms receiving federal aid will be subject to shareholder say on pay and will be required to cap executive compensation at $500,000 with any additional compensation given out in restricted stocks which can be cashed only after the government has been repaid or the bank has satisfied repayment obligations, and met lending and stability standards. Moreover, bonuses and compensation for other top executives will also be reduced. At the very least the Treasury is going to require disclosure of the compensation structure and strategy, and expenditure on luxury items. Still, while the government's intervention is warranted, the compensation reform being put forward does little to align risks with rewards. Sadly reports are that Geithner fought for real compensation reform.

A large share of the compensation can and will be given out in restricted stocks including compensation for several traders and funds managers who are not under the lenses of the current plan. These measures also give a green light to those who have already received large compensation and severance packages at the troubled banks. More importantly, the measures might act a disincentive in attracting credible executive talent to these troubled institutions in the future who can help deal with the bank losses and overhaul. Wall Street compensation is determined in a competitive market with CEOs joining a firm offering the most attractive pay packages and perks. Many banks are already reluctant to seek capital injection from the Treasury or are contemplating to payback past borrowings in order to avoid government scrutiny over their compensation packages. There is too much voluntary action on the part of the banks. The government needs to be much more forceful. These companies caused the financial crisis, and should not have the luxery of choosing to take part in this package.

To reduce excessive risk-taking in the short-run, compensation, bonuses and even severance packages should be based on the long-term performance of the employee relative to the risk undertaken with large part of the payments given out in restricted stocks that can be redeemed over a longer period of time.

Geithner to Announce New Plan

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner is scheduled to unveil a plan to handle the government's second half of the $700 billion financial rescue program today. The plan as it is being leaked is to impose tough new standards on future payments to banks. It also calls for greatly expanding an effort to unclog credit markets to provide loans to consumers and businesses. The administration also announced that the program would be expanded beyond consumer and small business loans to provide aid to the troubled commercial real estate sector.


The administration's new plan will include a government-private sector partnership aimed at removing toxic assets from banks' balance sheets, although the details on how this program would operate were still being worked out.

The Obama administration is promising an aggressive effort to combat the worst financial crisis in seven decades, unveiling a program that could mobilize well over $1 trillion in public and private support to get the frozen credit markets functioning again.

The new plan would greatly expand an effort to unclog credit markets that provide loans to consumers and businesses. Funding for this effort would see a huge increase — from $20 billion up to $100 billion.

Barack Obama's Economic Press Conference - 11/24/2008

President-elect Barack Obama came out and held a press conference today to introduce his economic team. At the press conference Obama formally named New York Federal Reserve president Timothy Geithner as the next Treasury secretary to replace current holder Henry Paulson, and tapped former Treasury chief Larry Summers as his chief White House economic advisor.

During the news conference Obama said, 'We can't allow the auto industry to vanish,' Obama says, but urges no 'blank check'

Here is video of today's press conference:



LibertyAir Blog

Obama's Economic Leadership Team to be Unveiled

President-elect Obama is planning a press conference today to introduce the leaders of his economic team, which is headed by Harvard economist Larry Summers, who will run the White House National Economic Council, and New York Federal Reserve Bank President Timothy Geithner, his choice for Treasury secretary.

The president-elect is likely to use the event to assure investors and consumers that he will take rapid, large-scale action in the coming weeks and months. The message will be: "This is an extraordinary time, and extraordinary responses are going to be needed."

At the news conference, President-elect Obama will likely offer for the first time an explicit pledge to honor all commitments already made by the Bush administration in the TARP program, without imposing new conditions even if there are changes are made to the program in the future. Obama officials also say the president-elect will promise to find spending cuts to try to keeps short-term stimulus spending from exploding the budget deficit even more than it already has over the long term.

Since winning the presidency, Obama has expressed reluctance to begin steering economic policy, repeatedly saying the country can have only one president at a time. Large-scale economic stimulus is all but impossible before Obama takes office, since Bush has said he would oppose big new spending plans before he leaves the White House.

But President-elect Obama and his team have in recent days indicated fairly explicitly that a considerable boost to the economy will come as soon as he takes office. While Obama advisers have so far declined to detail publicly just how large the stimulus would be, there have been credible reports calling for a $500 to $700 billion stimulus package that would be injected directly into the economy.

Democratic leaders in Congress are preparing to hurry passage shortly after New Year's to have a stimulus-plan bill ready for Mr. Obama to sign once he is inaugurated Jan. 20.

Obama Said to Pick Geithner as Treasury Secretary

President-elect Barack Obama picked Timothy Geithner, head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be his Treasury secretary. Geithner has helped lead U.S. efforts to combat the deepest financial crisis in seven decades, helping oversee the decisions this year to take over American International Group Inc., rescue Bear Stearns Cos. and leave Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. to fail. Geithner, 47, served as an undersecretary for international affairs under Larry Summers, and has been at the helm of the New York Fed since November 2003.

As head of the New York Fed, Geithner has served as the central bank’s top liaison with Wall Street. Geithner oversaw meetings at his bank to attempt to head off Lehman’s failure in September, later hosting gatherings on how to resolve AIG.

Geithner is no stranger to Washington or the Treasury. Before taking over the New York Fed in 2003, he spent most of the previous 18 years working in the nation’s capital, first at Kissinger Associates, then at the Treasury and finally at the International Monetary Fund.
During that time, Geithner earned what his one-time mentor Summers called a “doctorate in financial policy.” He also developed a skill-set his supporters say makes him well suited for his new job: calmness under pressure, an ability to see many sides of a problem and a sense of the politically possible.