The U.S. economy contracted at pace of 6.3% at end of 2008, slightly worse than had been
previously reported. This was the worst showing in a quarter-century, and probably isn't doing much better this quarter.
Other news about the economy was not much better. New claims for unemployment benefits last week rose to a seasonally adjusted 652,000 from the previous week's revised figure of 644,000, the Labor Department said Thursday. The total number of people claiming benefits jumped to 5.56 million, higher than economists' projections of 5.48 million, and a ninth straight record-high. More job losses were announced this week. Shaw Industries Group Inc., the world's largest carpet maker and a subsidiary of Warren Buffett's holding company Berkshire Hathaway Inc., said it would close two plants in Georgia and lay off about 600 workers. Pharmaceutical company Hospira Inc. said it would cut 1,450 jobs, or about 10 percent of its work force, while beleaguered automaker General Motors Corp. said it laid off 160 engineers, the beginning of 3,400 planned cuts among its salaried employees.
The figures indicate the labor market remains weak even as some other economic indicators have come in better than expected. All the negative forces that are occurring in the economy are now feeding each other in a vicious cycle that has only deepened the recession, now in its second year, and really made this a Great Recession.
Showing posts with label Financial Crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Financial Crisis. Show all posts
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Making Sense of Geithner's Plan
Man there are a lot of people lining up against Tim Geithner's plan for ridding the financial system of 'toxic assets'. Of course people have lampooned that Geithner has changed the name to 'legacy assets', though I thought this was smart public relations. It might sound silly but rebranding works.
I don't like Geithner as the head of the Treasurery Department, he is not up too the job, which requires more than an understanding of the financial system. And I do think that Obama should have other voices on his economic team.
However I think that some critics of the new plan are confusing their dislike of Geithner with his plan. Not all, I think Professor Krugman brings up some relavent areas of concern, but on the whole, I am more optimistic of this plan than many.
One question I have heard is why is the Obama administration going with this plan, my uninformed opinion is the Obam administration is trying to avoid anything that requires legislative action. Lets face it, nothing coming out of Congress has any real chance of fixing this mess.
The main components of Treasury Secretary Geithner’s new PPIP to price and remove toxic assets from banks’ balance sheets are as follows:
Here are the Basic Principles of the Plan: Treasury will use $75bn - $100bn in TARP money to co-invest alongside private sector participants and the FDIC as well as the Federal Reserve, to buy $500bn to $1 trillion of toxic mortgage assets (both residential and commercial) off banks’ books ('toxic assets' I mean ‘legacy assets’)
There are two separate approaches that Geithner has for legacy loans and for legacy securities. At first, Treasury will share its $75-100bn equity stake equally between the two programs with the option to shift the bulk of financing towards the option with the greater promise of success with market participants.
1) Public-Private Program for Legacy Loans: The FDIC is going to establish several public-private investment funds whose sole purpose will be to purchase and hold specific loan pools put up for sale by banks (large and small). The transaction price will be established by the highest bid at an auction run by the FDIC, in which a wide array of institutional investors and even individuals with a long-term orientation are encouraged to participate. The liabilities of the investment fund consist of an equity stake (50% of which provided by auction winner, 50% from Treasury TARP), and collateralized debt issued by the investment fund and guaranteed by the FDIC to finance the remainder of the purchase price (FDIC gets guarantee fee). Before the auction, the FDIC specifies the pool-specific debt-to-equity ratio it is willing to guarantee subject to a maximum 6-to-1 leverage ratio. The private investor would then manage the servicing of the asset pool - using asset managers approved and supervised by the FDIC - until disposal or maturity.
Example: Assuming a 6-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio, the highest bid for a loan pool with $100 face value might turn out to be $84. Of this amount, the FDIC would provide $72 in debt guarantees whereas the equity stake of $12 would be shared equally between the auction winner ($6) and the Treasury ($6).
2) Legacy Securities Program: The legacy securities program is to be incorporated into the Term Asset-Backed Securities Facility (TALF) whose original goal was to provide collateralized financing (non-recourse loans) to buyers of newly created consumer loan/small business loan ABS. Under the Legacy Securities Program, the eligible collateral for TALF is extended to include non-agency RMBS that were originally rated AAA and outstanding CMBS and ABS that are rated AAA.
Example: Under the Legacy Securities Program, up to five Treasury-approved fund managers will have a period of time to raise private capital to target the purchase of designated securities. Assuming the fund manager is able to raise $100 of private capital for the fund, Treasury will provide $100 equity co-investment alongside private investors. Treasury will then provide a $100 loan to the public-private investment fund. Moreover, Treasury may also choose to provide an additional loan of up to $100 to the fund. The investment fund then has $300-$400 at its disposal to buy legacy securities at its discretion. As a purchaser of TALF-eligible securities, the PPIF would also have access to the expanded TALF program of collateralized Fed loans when it is launched.
Assessment
The main sticking points in previous market-based approaches to clear toxic assets from banks’ books were threefold:
The theoretical foundations of Geithner’s plan are provided by Lucian Bebchuk from Harvard University among others. He explains that “if the underlying market failure is at least partly one of liquidity, an effective plan for a public-private partnership in buying troubled assets can be designed. The key is to have competition at two levels.First, at the level of buying troubled assets, the government’s program should focus on establishing many competing funds that are privately managed and partly funded with private capital-- and not creating one, large "aggregator bank"-- funded with public and private capital and engaging in purchasing troubled assets. Second, several potential fund managers should compete for government capital under a market mechanism resulting in maximum participation of private capital and minimum costs to taxpayers.”
Geithner’s plan seems to follow these guidelines to a large degree. In particular, on the one hand the government subsidy allows private investors to bid a higher price than otherwise warranted (i.e. the government gives investors the equivalent of a call option.) On the other hand, the fact that the private investor is bound to lose its entire equity stake if the asset value deteriorates from artificially high valuations provides an incentive to bid conservatively. Both effects together may contribute to a reasonable level of price discovery. In case of the securities program, the prospect of refinancing purchased legacy securities with TALF via a non-recourse loan (which is the equivalent of a put option) should incentivize private investors to bid higher than otherwise warranted.
b) Will banks participate?
A similar purely private solution to get toxic assets off banks’ balance sheets was tried with Paulson’s aborted Super-SIV when legacy assets were still marked substantially higher than at present. It became clear then that the private sector will require a possibly substantial taxpayer subsidy in order to overcome the collective action paralysis. Indeed, in the case of the legacy loan example outlined in the Geithner plan with a 6/1 leverage, private investors that invest 7.1% (=1/7 * 0.5) of the equity will get 50% of any upside in return. While Treasury will also share in any upside by half, any downside beyond the private investors’ equity stake is clearly borne by the taxpayers.
While this subsidy to investors provides a powerful incentive to bid prices up in a competitive auction, banks stuck with particularly toxic assets or thin capital buffers may still find a potential writedown at market-clearing prices prohibitive and some might need to be recapitalized after taking the hair cut. FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair has already warned that while this plan will help many solvent banks get rid of their toxic assets thus clearing the way for new loans and fresh capital some banks are beyond the stage of rescue. Those borderline insolvent banks will likely require an additional incentive to sell or mandatory participation otherwise they will prefer to hold on to their assets, especially in view of the FASB’s prospective easing of mark-to-market accounting rules.
For the sake completeness, some commentators would also like to see better safeguards established in order to prevent banks and asset managers from potentially colluding in their common interest to the detriment of the taxpayer.
c) And taxpayers?
At the end of the day the performance of the toxic legacy assets is driven by the cash flow performance of the underlying loans. Keep in mind that among subprime borrowers, serious delinquencies and foreclosures have affected about 20% of outstanding loans as of December 2008 thus impairing the cash flow directed to junior RMBS investors and/or ABS CDOs consisting of these junior tranches. While ABX prices responded positively to the prospect of increased buyer interest, the ultimate loan value will depend on whether households and commercial real estate borrowers will continue making payments in the future. More on that below.
As a practical example of the performance of a toxic portfolio, take the Fed’s Maiden Lane portfolio with Bear Stearns assets. Cumberland Advisors reported that so far the results aren’t promising, and they see no prospect for a profit on the assets. In fact, the portfolio has lost over 10% of its value, and losses are mounting. At present, losses on that portfolio exceed $4.5 billion and the taxpayers’ share is now $3.5 billion. Others point to the low recovery value of IndyMac’s mortgage portfolio as a benchmark.
Bottom line: Will it get credit flowing again?
The immediate market reaction (equities and investment grade CDS staged a substantial rally, less so high yield CDS) was clearly one of relief that nationalization seems to be off the table for now and that the administration is committed to market-based solutions. While the extent of the guarantees almost makes one wonder why the involvement of the private sector is needed in the first place, it is the involvement of the private sector that creates a context in which price setting and discovery happen based on a market mechanism.
An important question at this point is: What should we look at while assessing the plan in the months ahead?
Clearly the unfreeze of credit markets would be the first sign of success but we might not see this happening before some time. Some of the banks that choose to sell assets and take a writedown might be in need of additional capital before they can resume lending. Also, for those institutions that are beyond the stage of rescue and effectively insolvent, the plan will likely not be as effective in stimulating lending or participation in the first place.
The increase in the supply of credit that will come from institutions that are solvent will be important, but will demand be there to do its part? If the real side of the economy continues to deteriorate, it is likely that credit demand might be subdued. Moreover, a further continued deterioration on the real side of the economy would imply new defaults on credit cards, consumer loans, auto loans and mortgages that would result in new toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions recreating an environment where banks would maintain stringent lending standards. Therefore, the success of the plan is a necessary but not sufficient condition to get the economy back on a recovery path. The success of the fiscal stimulus package in sustaining aggregate demand and minimizing job losses and the success in restarting demand in the housing sector will be instrumental to put a stop to the negative feedback loop between the real and the financial side of the economy.
Moreover, if the negative feedback loop persists, need for further funding will arise. While it will be very challenging to obtain Congress approval for additional TARP money, we should point out that the government has set aside an additional $750bn in the FY2010 budget in aid for the financial sector.
Hence, taking care of legacy loans and securities is a welcome step forward, especially for solvent institutions whose asset values are subject to a substantial liquidity discount. However, insolvent institutions might not find as much relief from this plan, and the impact of the plan on the real economy might not be enough to pull the economy out of a contraction for good part of this year and sluggish growth thereafter. But by conducting auctions and determining the market value of the toxic assets, the Treasury will be implicitly using the private sector to ‘stress test’ the financial system to determine which banks are insolvent and therefore will need further government intervention.
I don't like Geithner as the head of the Treasurery Department, he is not up too the job, which requires more than an understanding of the financial system. And I do think that Obama should have other voices on his economic team.
However I think that some critics of the new plan are confusing their dislike of Geithner with his plan. Not all, I think Professor Krugman brings up some relavent areas of concern, but on the whole, I am more optimistic of this plan than many.
One question I have heard is why is the Obama administration going with this plan, my uninformed opinion is the Obam administration is trying to avoid anything that requires legislative action. Lets face it, nothing coming out of Congress has any real chance of fixing this mess.
The main components of Treasury Secretary Geithner’s new PPIP to price and remove toxic assets from banks’ balance sheets are as follows:
Here are the Basic Principles of the Plan: Treasury will use $75bn - $100bn in TARP money to co-invest alongside private sector participants and the FDIC as well as the Federal Reserve, to buy $500bn to $1 trillion of toxic mortgage assets (both residential and commercial) off banks’ books ('toxic assets' I mean ‘legacy assets’)
There are two separate approaches that Geithner has for legacy loans and for legacy securities. At first, Treasury will share its $75-100bn equity stake equally between the two programs with the option to shift the bulk of financing towards the option with the greater promise of success with market participants.
1) Public-Private Program for Legacy Loans: The FDIC is going to establish several public-private investment funds whose sole purpose will be to purchase and hold specific loan pools put up for sale by banks (large and small). The transaction price will be established by the highest bid at an auction run by the FDIC, in which a wide array of institutional investors and even individuals with a long-term orientation are encouraged to participate. The liabilities of the investment fund consist of an equity stake (50% of which provided by auction winner, 50% from Treasury TARP), and collateralized debt issued by the investment fund and guaranteed by the FDIC to finance the remainder of the purchase price (FDIC gets guarantee fee). Before the auction, the FDIC specifies the pool-specific debt-to-equity ratio it is willing to guarantee subject to a maximum 6-to-1 leverage ratio. The private investor would then manage the servicing of the asset pool - using asset managers approved and supervised by the FDIC - until disposal or maturity.
Example: Assuming a 6-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio, the highest bid for a loan pool with $100 face value might turn out to be $84. Of this amount, the FDIC would provide $72 in debt guarantees whereas the equity stake of $12 would be shared equally between the auction winner ($6) and the Treasury ($6).
2) Legacy Securities Program: The legacy securities program is to be incorporated into the Term Asset-Backed Securities Facility (TALF) whose original goal was to provide collateralized financing (non-recourse loans) to buyers of newly created consumer loan/small business loan ABS. Under the Legacy Securities Program, the eligible collateral for TALF is extended to include non-agency RMBS that were originally rated AAA and outstanding CMBS and ABS that are rated AAA.
Example: Under the Legacy Securities Program, up to five Treasury-approved fund managers will have a period of time to raise private capital to target the purchase of designated securities. Assuming the fund manager is able to raise $100 of private capital for the fund, Treasury will provide $100 equity co-investment alongside private investors. Treasury will then provide a $100 loan to the public-private investment fund. Moreover, Treasury may also choose to provide an additional loan of up to $100 to the fund. The investment fund then has $300-$400 at its disposal to buy legacy securities at its discretion. As a purchaser of TALF-eligible securities, the PPIF would also have access to the expanded TALF program of collateralized Fed loans when it is launched.
Assessment
The main sticking points in previous market-based approaches to clear toxic assets from banks’ books were threefold:
a) Valuation of Illiquid Assetsa) How to value illiquid assets?
b) Once a transaction price is established, will banks be willing to sell and take a hair cut?
c) How to induce private investors to purchase legacy assets without unduly wasting taxpayer money?
The theoretical foundations of Geithner’s plan are provided by Lucian Bebchuk from Harvard University among others. He explains that “if the underlying market failure is at least partly one of liquidity, an effective plan for a public-private partnership in buying troubled assets can be designed. The key is to have competition at two levels.First, at the level of buying troubled assets, the government’s program should focus on establishing many competing funds that are privately managed and partly funded with private capital-- and not creating one, large "aggregator bank"-- funded with public and private capital and engaging in purchasing troubled assets. Second, several potential fund managers should compete for government capital under a market mechanism resulting in maximum participation of private capital and minimum costs to taxpayers.”
Geithner’s plan seems to follow these guidelines to a large degree. In particular, on the one hand the government subsidy allows private investors to bid a higher price than otherwise warranted (i.e. the government gives investors the equivalent of a call option.) On the other hand, the fact that the private investor is bound to lose its entire equity stake if the asset value deteriorates from artificially high valuations provides an incentive to bid conservatively. Both effects together may contribute to a reasonable level of price discovery. In case of the securities program, the prospect of refinancing purchased legacy securities with TALF via a non-recourse loan (which is the equivalent of a put option) should incentivize private investors to bid higher than otherwise warranted.
b) Will banks participate?
A similar purely private solution to get toxic assets off banks’ balance sheets was tried with Paulson’s aborted Super-SIV when legacy assets were still marked substantially higher than at present. It became clear then that the private sector will require a possibly substantial taxpayer subsidy in order to overcome the collective action paralysis. Indeed, in the case of the legacy loan example outlined in the Geithner plan with a 6/1 leverage, private investors that invest 7.1% (=1/7 * 0.5) of the equity will get 50% of any upside in return. While Treasury will also share in any upside by half, any downside beyond the private investors’ equity stake is clearly borne by the taxpayers.
While this subsidy to investors provides a powerful incentive to bid prices up in a competitive auction, banks stuck with particularly toxic assets or thin capital buffers may still find a potential writedown at market-clearing prices prohibitive and some might need to be recapitalized after taking the hair cut. FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair has already warned that while this plan will help many solvent banks get rid of their toxic assets thus clearing the way for new loans and fresh capital some banks are beyond the stage of rescue. Those borderline insolvent banks will likely require an additional incentive to sell or mandatory participation otherwise they will prefer to hold on to their assets, especially in view of the FASB’s prospective easing of mark-to-market accounting rules.
For the sake completeness, some commentators would also like to see better safeguards established in order to prevent banks and asset managers from potentially colluding in their common interest to the detriment of the taxpayer.
c) And taxpayers?
At the end of the day the performance of the toxic legacy assets is driven by the cash flow performance of the underlying loans. Keep in mind that among subprime borrowers, serious delinquencies and foreclosures have affected about 20% of outstanding loans as of December 2008 thus impairing the cash flow directed to junior RMBS investors and/or ABS CDOs consisting of these junior tranches. While ABX prices responded positively to the prospect of increased buyer interest, the ultimate loan value will depend on whether households and commercial real estate borrowers will continue making payments in the future. More on that below.
As a practical example of the performance of a toxic portfolio, take the Fed’s Maiden Lane portfolio with Bear Stearns assets. Cumberland Advisors reported that so far the results aren’t promising, and they see no prospect for a profit on the assets. In fact, the portfolio has lost over 10% of its value, and losses are mounting. At present, losses on that portfolio exceed $4.5 billion and the taxpayers’ share is now $3.5 billion. Others point to the low recovery value of IndyMac’s mortgage portfolio as a benchmark.
Bottom line: Will it get credit flowing again?
The immediate market reaction (equities and investment grade CDS staged a substantial rally, less so high yield CDS) was clearly one of relief that nationalization seems to be off the table for now and that the administration is committed to market-based solutions. While the extent of the guarantees almost makes one wonder why the involvement of the private sector is needed in the first place, it is the involvement of the private sector that creates a context in which price setting and discovery happen based on a market mechanism.
An important question at this point is: What should we look at while assessing the plan in the months ahead?
Clearly the unfreeze of credit markets would be the first sign of success but we might not see this happening before some time. Some of the banks that choose to sell assets and take a writedown might be in need of additional capital before they can resume lending. Also, for those institutions that are beyond the stage of rescue and effectively insolvent, the plan will likely not be as effective in stimulating lending or participation in the first place.
The increase in the supply of credit that will come from institutions that are solvent will be important, but will demand be there to do its part? If the real side of the economy continues to deteriorate, it is likely that credit demand might be subdued. Moreover, a further continued deterioration on the real side of the economy would imply new defaults on credit cards, consumer loans, auto loans and mortgages that would result in new toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions recreating an environment where banks would maintain stringent lending standards. Therefore, the success of the plan is a necessary but not sufficient condition to get the economy back on a recovery path. The success of the fiscal stimulus package in sustaining aggregate demand and minimizing job losses and the success in restarting demand in the housing sector will be instrumental to put a stop to the negative feedback loop between the real and the financial side of the economy.
Moreover, if the negative feedback loop persists, need for further funding will arise. While it will be very challenging to obtain Congress approval for additional TARP money, we should point out that the government has set aside an additional $750bn in the FY2010 budget in aid for the financial sector.
Hence, taking care of legacy loans and securities is a welcome step forward, especially for solvent institutions whose asset values are subject to a substantial liquidity discount. However, insolvent institutions might not find as much relief from this plan, and the impact of the plan on the real economy might not be enough to pull the economy out of a contraction for good part of this year and sluggish growth thereafter. But by conducting auctions and determining the market value of the toxic assets, the Treasury will be implicitly using the private sector to ‘stress test’ the financial system to determine which banks are insolvent and therefore will need further government intervention.
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Roubini: Recession Might Not Be Half Way Over
Dr. Doom, Professor Nouriel Roubini is the man who predicted the current financial crisis and yesterday he said the U.S. recession could drag on for years without drastic action. He says that this recession could last 36 months. As we are in the 15th month of a recession this is not good.
This is a nation of shopped-out and debt-burdened consumers who just lost their ability to keep over spending. They lost their resilience and started to give up on spending in the third quarter of 2008. This was when for the first time in two decades, personal consumption contracted. With personal consumption making up for over two-thirds of aggregate demand for the U.S. economy, the outlook for the U.S. is not good for 2009. Consumers are still at the center of the dynamics that will play out in the real economy in 2009.
Professor Roubini told CNBC in a live interview:
Professor Roubini also said he sees:
Last he again pushed the idea of bank nationalization of at least the four major banks:
According to Professor Roubini, unfortunately, Tim Geithner's Financial Stability plan won't solve our financial woes because it assumes that the system is solvent, while nationalization is the only option that would permit us to solve the problem of toxic assets in an orderly fashion and allow lending finally to resume.
This is a nation of shopped-out and debt-burdened consumers who just lost their ability to keep over spending. They lost their resilience and started to give up on spending in the third quarter of 2008. This was when for the first time in two decades, personal consumption contracted. With personal consumption making up for over two-thirds of aggregate demand for the U.S. economy, the outlook for the U.S. is not good for 2009. Consumers are still at the center of the dynamics that will play out in the real economy in 2009.
Professor Roubini told CNBC in a live interview:
"Growth is going to be close to zero and unemployment rate well above 10 percent into next year."
Professor Roubini also said he sees:
"There is no hope for the recession ending in 2009 and will more than likely last into 2010."
Last he again pushed the idea of bank nationalization of at least the four major banks:
"Most of the U.S. financial institutions are entirely insolvent."
"The market friendly view for the banks is nationalization."
"Temporarily take over the banks, clean them up and get them working again."
According to Professor Roubini, unfortunately, Tim Geithner's Financial Stability plan won't solve our financial woes because it assumes that the system is solvent, while nationalization is the only option that would permit us to solve the problem of toxic assets in an orderly fashion and allow lending finally to resume.
Sunday, March 08, 2009
President Obama's Weekly Address - March 7 2009
President Barack Obama used his weekly address to detail his plans to fix our ailing economy, noting that reforming healthcare is necessary to ensure our long term fiscal health.
Watch It Here:
LibertyAir Blog
Watch It Here:
LibertyAir Blog
Friday, March 06, 2009
Bankers Don't Care About the Banks
I am a huge fan of the Young Turks and wanted to point out this must-read piece that their host Cenk Uygar wrote:
Tim Geithner and Larry Summers and many others are missing the fundamental flaw in the system. The bankers don't care about the banks; they care about the
bankers.These days, the way executives make money instead is in the form of bonuses for years where they bring in a lot of return (and often times for years they don't), but the threat of being fired for too much risk taking is minimal. The more risk you take, the more money everyone makes. And it's not the partner's money you're playing with anymore. You're playing with house money. No one is minding the store anymore.
So, now we have Tim Geithner and the rest of Treasury working so hard to prop up not just these failed banks - but these failed bank executives - because we don't want government running these large companies. The self-interest of the market will do a better job of managing these companies. But it hasn't - because of this fundamental flaw.
These executives did not actually fail. They succeeded wildly. It's just that they had a different goal - to take home as much money as they possibly could for themselves. Mission accomplished!
The Treasury plan is all wrong. We have to first acknowledge that the boards of these companies are not truly representing the shareholders. They are largely friends with most of the CEOs and they do not have an incentive to reign in out of control compensation for the top executives. Then those CEOs pass on the wrong incentives to the executives below them. The more risk they all take, the more money they take home. And if their company goes broke one day - who cares?
Most of these guys took home millions upon millions of dollars already for profits that never really existed. If the company goes under, okay the gravy train came to an end but they still have all the money they made from all those years. It's in their personal bank accounts. That's enlightened self-interest!
Do you know that last year, as Merrill Lynch was in its death throes, 696 executives got bonuses over a million dollars? 696! As the company lost tens of billions of dollars, the executives took home a combined $3.6 billion that year. Billions in bonuses in the worst year in the company's history. They're not stupid; they're smart. They're looting the store before the cops show up.
This is the financial equivalent of the federal government not showing up to rescue people after Hurricane Katrina. Last year the five biggest Wall Street securities firms lost $25.3 billion. The executives at those companies still took home $26 billion in bonuses. In other words, they wouldn't have lost a nickel if they hadn't taken any bonuses.
The Treasury Department still hasn't shown up to take over these looted stores. In fact, they keep pouring taxpayer money into these same shops, as the money continues to move out the back door. Tim Geithner is the worst sheriff in the world.
But we already knew that. Because the main guy who was overseeing all of these banks in New York, as they took these giants risks, was the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York - Tim Geithner.He is under the misimpression that his job is to protect the sanctity of the banks.
Not only is that not his job, but that is working against his actual goal. His real job is to stabilize the financial system, with or without these particular banks or bank executives. The longer he keeps these guys in charge, the longer the looting continues.
Monday, March 02, 2009
Dow Headed towards 6000
The Dow has gone below 7000 today. I used to think that 7000 was the floor that this crisis on Wall Street would hit, but 7000 was not the floor, and 6000 may be the floor.
Friday, February 27, 2009
Fourth Quarter GDP Figures Have Been Revised
To all those who have tried to suggest the economic problems of this country are not that bad (I'm looking at you Republicans) and that there were even signs of recovery at the end of Bush's administration, the news today is not good.
Highlighting that this nation is facing a major crisis, the fourth quarter GDP figures have been revised.
Highlighting that this nation is facing a major crisis, the fourth quarter GDP figures have been revised.
Professor Krugman comments in his blogIn Revision, G.D.P. Shrank at 6.2% Rate at the End of 2008, by Catherein Rampell, New York Times: The economy at the end of last year contracted at a far faster rate than initially estimated... With the exception of government spending, every major component of the economy shrank.
Output fell 6.2 percent at an annualized rate in the fourth quarter of 2008, revised downward from a previous estimate of a 3.8 percent decline.
The economy took the biggest hits in exports, retail sales, equipment and software, and residential fixed investment.
The downward revisions, though, came primarily because of a larger-than-anticipated contraction in inventories of unsold goods. ... Some hail the decline in inventories as potentially good news.
“The only plus to take out of this is that inventories weren’t as high, and that implies you don’t have to cut as much this quarter to get them back under control,” Mr. Gault said. He added that inventories were still too high, and he expected companies to further scale back their production, especially in response to the dismal consumer spending numbers.
Households also saved much more of their paychecks than initially estimated.
This will be a surprise for some, but it just confirms what most people thought was happening.And if the data on new unemployment claims are any indication (which they are), the economy is continuing to plunge at least as fast.
As Brad DeLong says, I think we’re going to need a bigger stimulus.
Should The US Consider Nationalizing Banks That Are In Trouble
Professor Nouriel Roubini of Global EconoMonitor, who is also known as Dr. Doom (because he for years was warning of the on-coming financial crisis) has given several interviews over the lasy week to Business New Europe, Charlie Rose, Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, Reuters, ABC, NBR and CNBC.
In his CNBC interview, he strongly advocates a Swedish-style bank nationalization to repair the ailing financial system and prevent banks from turning into 'zombie banks' like were in Japan.
Even Conservatives like Alan Greenspan and Senator Graham have publicly suggested that the idea of nationalization may be needed. Professor Roubini has pointed to this in a number of interviews like the one he had with Tunku Varadarajan in Wall Street Journal.
The biggest barrier to nationalization is the negative public image as 'Bolshevik' rather than 'pragmatic.' But this is stupid, and the result of idiots like Hannerty, Limbaugh, and Republican politicians who toss out accusations of socialism and communism without consideration. Nationalizing troubled banks would allow the government to take distressed assets without having to set a price.
For those who are scared of the word 'nationalization' you should consider the example of IndyMac, a bank that was nationalized and quickly re-privatized in less than a year. IndyMac was an example of a company that needed to be seized.
During a discussion of the banking crisis on ABC's This Week with George Stephonopilis that featured Professor Roubini, Professor Paul Krugman and George Will, and they discussed a temporary nationalization. Professor Krugman suggested calling nationalization “pre-privatization” to sugarcoat the program. Krugman also points out that in 2009 we have already nationalized 14 banks. Similarily the Federal government took control of mortgage finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in early September of 2008.
Administration officials say they are determined to maintain the appearance, and in important respects the reality, that banks remain under private ownership. I do not agree with this, the current leadership of these banks are the major problem. The Obama administration argues that they have a responsibility to pursue the least costly solution, and that they continue to believe smaller steps than nationalization can resolve the crisis. They are wrong.
Another argument against nationilzation is that the U.S. Banking system is larger than Swedens, and while the problem is spread across many of the nation's 8,300 banks, the bulk of the problem is in a concentrated few. Fix these mega banks like Citi and Bank of America and you have taken the largest concentration of troubled assets. Nationalize these mega banks, and break them up, no bank should ever be 'too big to fail.'
No one is arguing that the banks should be nationalized on a permanent basis. Those who are arguing against that are attacking straw men.
Obama and his economic team need to step-up as leaders and whether they call it Nationalization or not (it will most probably be called receivership or conservatorship) and take over those major banks that have dragged the economy down.
In his CNBC interview, he strongly advocates a Swedish-style bank nationalization to repair the ailing financial system and prevent banks from turning into 'zombie banks' like were in Japan.
"If you don't nationalize them on a temporary basis the fiscal commitments will be bigger. The alternative is actually a dangerous debt spiral.”The Swedish-style bank nationalization is where the government of Sweden in 1992 had to deal with the collapse of a real estate bubble and had to take control of two of that country's largest banks, Nordbanken and Gota. The government stripped the banks of their bad assets, which it kept in a pair of new companies known as "bad banks." The remnant "good banks" were then merged into a single company and launched back into the marketplace.
Even Conservatives like Alan Greenspan and Senator Graham have publicly suggested that the idea of nationalization may be needed. Professor Roubini has pointed to this in a number of interviews like the one he had with Tunku Varadarajan in Wall Street Journal.
The biggest barrier to nationalization is the negative public image as 'Bolshevik' rather than 'pragmatic.' But this is stupid, and the result of idiots like Hannerty, Limbaugh, and Republican politicians who toss out accusations of socialism and communism without consideration. Nationalizing troubled banks would allow the government to take distressed assets without having to set a price.
For those who are scared of the word 'nationalization' you should consider the example of IndyMac, a bank that was nationalized and quickly re-privatized in less than a year. IndyMac was an example of a company that needed to be seized.
During a discussion of the banking crisis on ABC's This Week with George Stephonopilis that featured Professor Roubini, Professor Paul Krugman and George Will, and they discussed a temporary nationalization. Professor Krugman suggested calling nationalization “pre-privatization” to sugarcoat the program. Krugman also points out that in 2009 we have already nationalized 14 banks. Similarily the Federal government took control of mortgage finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in early September of 2008.
Administration officials say they are determined to maintain the appearance, and in important respects the reality, that banks remain under private ownership. I do not agree with this, the current leadership of these banks are the major problem. The Obama administration argues that they have a responsibility to pursue the least costly solution, and that they continue to believe smaller steps than nationalization can resolve the crisis. They are wrong.
Another argument against nationilzation is that the U.S. Banking system is larger than Swedens, and while the problem is spread across many of the nation's 8,300 banks, the bulk of the problem is in a concentrated few. Fix these mega banks like Citi and Bank of America and you have taken the largest concentration of troubled assets. Nationalize these mega banks, and break them up, no bank should ever be 'too big to fail.'
No one is arguing that the banks should be nationalized on a permanent basis. Those who are arguing against that are attacking straw men.
Obama and his economic team need to step-up as leaders and whether they call it Nationalization or not (it will most probably be called receivership or conservatorship) and take over those major banks that have dragged the economy down.
Another Reason To Get The Pitchforks
The other day Cenk Uyger of the Young Turks explained in the "Memebers Only" portion of the show how the top 5 Wall Street Finanacial Institutions lost 25.3 Billion Dollars and then gave out 25 Billion Dollars in bonuses.
Get that the companies lost 25.3 Billion and in the same year they paid 25 Billion in bonuses. If they cut the bonues, they would not have lost any money.
Now we are just talking bonuses here, this is not their full compensation. They would have been paid, they would just not have received their bonuses, and considering the job they had done, no bonuses should have been paid.
If you are not a member of the Young Turks, I would recommend joining so you can have access to the "Memebers Only" portion of the show.
Get that the companies lost 25.3 Billion and in the same year they paid 25 Billion in bonuses. If they cut the bonues, they would not have lost any money.
Now we are just talking bonuses here, this is not their full compensation. They would have been paid, they would just not have received their bonuses, and considering the job they had done, no bonuses should have been paid.
If you are not a member of the Young Turks, I would recommend joining so you can have access to the "Memebers Only" portion of the show.
Ever Closer To a World Wide Depression
I was just passing through a room that had CNN on, and the report out of Japan was not good.
Sony is sacking its President CEO, and is turning to their head of British operations. Japanese Car companies are reporting that sails are down 40%, and while unemployment remains the same, they are reporting this is due to people giving up on looking for jobs, rather than any stabilization.
This financial crisis is not ending any time soon, and the problem is worse than most understand.
Sony is sacking its President CEO, and is turning to their head of British operations. Japanese Car companies are reporting that sails are down 40%, and while unemployment remains the same, they are reporting this is due to people giving up on looking for jobs, rather than any stabilization.
This financial crisis is not ending any time soon, and the problem is worse than most understand.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
Playing Symantics
Yesterday Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke had this to say about nationalizing banks:
Some our saying this is proof that the Obama administration is not considering nationalizing some of the major banks which are on the verge of collapse. I however take from this that the Obama administration will be taking control of these banks, but calling it a different name.
"Nationalization, to my mind, is when government seizes the banks, zeros out the shareholders and begins to manage and run the bank, and we don't plan anything like that."
Some our saying this is proof that the Obama administration is not considering nationalizing some of the major banks which are on the verge of collapse. I however take from this that the Obama administration will be taking control of these banks, but calling it a different name.
Monday, February 23, 2009
Stocks Sink to Lowest Levels in a Decade
It's all gone. The Dow Jones industrial average tumbled 251 points to its lowest close since Oct. 28, 1997, while the Standard & Poor's 500 index logged its lowest finish since April 11, 1997. All the major indexes slid more than 3 percent.
Over a decades worth of capitol in the stock markets is gone, and I think it will be a long time before this money is remade.
As has been the case for the past nine months, financial stocks were the heart of the crash. Investors are still concerned that a number of the country's largest banks could be nationalized as they continue to suffer severe losses because of their mismanagement and the on-going recession. They're also worried that banks' losses will keep escalating as the recession sends more borrowers into default.
The market's decline extends massive losses from last week when the major stock indexes tumbled more than 6 percent. The major indexes plunged through the lows they reached in late November, at the height of the credit crisis.
Over a decades worth of capitol in the stock markets is gone, and I think it will be a long time before this money is remade.
As has been the case for the past nine months, financial stocks were the heart of the crash. Investors are still concerned that a number of the country's largest banks could be nationalized as they continue to suffer severe losses because of their mismanagement and the on-going recession. They're also worried that banks' losses will keep escalating as the recession sends more borrowers into default.
The market's decline extends massive losses from last week when the major stock indexes tumbled more than 6 percent. The major indexes plunged through the lows they reached in late November, at the height of the credit crisis.
Friday, February 20, 2009
All Gone
The Dow Jones closed down at its lowest level in six years. The gains in the market during the Bush years are all gone. The gains made after the crash which came in the wake of 9-11 are all gone. The Dow is at about half of its all-time high of 14,164, which was reached in October 2007. The total value of all shares of companies on the Dow has now dwindled to $2.45 trillion, down from $4.51 trillion. Bank stocks have been especially hit as investors grow increasingly nervous about the fragile economy.
This economic crisis is going to be one for the history books. The trouble is our government has become so split and dysfunctional, I'm not sure it can meet the needs of the crisis. Look at what has been happening in California. California is the world's 8th largest economy, but has a 42 billion dollar deficit. They needed a draconian budget of tax increases and cost cutting to keep going yet Republicans were not willing to work with Democrats and compromise. Luckily at the last minute the disaster was averted in California.
This economic crisis is going to be one for the history books. The trouble is our government has become so split and dysfunctional, I'm not sure it can meet the needs of the crisis. Look at what has been happening in California. California is the world's 8th largest economy, but has a 42 billion dollar deficit. They needed a draconian budget of tax increases and cost cutting to keep going yet Republicans were not willing to work with Democrats and compromise. Luckily at the last minute the disaster was averted in California.
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
Fed Downgrades Economic Forecast for this Year
Do not expect a quick ending to the recession/depression lite, because today the Federal Reserve sharply downgraded its projections for the country's economic performance this year. They are predicting that the U.S. economy will actually shrink, while unemployment will grow.
Dear God when will it end.
Under the Fed's new projections, the unemployment rate will rise to between 8.5 and 8.8 percent this year. Personally I think they are being conservative here, I bet that it will be between 9.0 and 9.2. Of course this is using the metrics that don't count millions, and the actual number will be over 16 percent. Now the old forecasts, issued in mid-November, predicted the jobless rate would rise to between 7.1 and 7.6 percent. This was always a laugh. Employment is almost always the last part of the economy to heal once it emerges out of recession and is in recovery mode. Therefore the jobs picture will remain grim for years to come.
The Fed also believes the economy will contract this year between 0.5 and 1.3 percent. The old forecast said the economy could shrink by 0.2 percent or expand by 1.1 percent. The last time the economy registered a contraction for a full year was in 1991, by 0.2 percent. If the Fed's new predictions prove correct, it would mark the weakest showing since a 1.9 percent drop in 1982, when the country had suffered through a severe recession.
Fed officials do predict that the economy should pick up speed in 2011, growing by as much as 5 percent, which would be considered robust, though I again say they are being optimistic.
Dear God when will it end.
Under the Fed's new projections, the unemployment rate will rise to between 8.5 and 8.8 percent this year. Personally I think they are being conservative here, I bet that it will be between 9.0 and 9.2. Of course this is using the metrics that don't count millions, and the actual number will be over 16 percent. Now the old forecasts, issued in mid-November, predicted the jobless rate would rise to between 7.1 and 7.6 percent. This was always a laugh. Employment is almost always the last part of the economy to heal once it emerges out of recession and is in recovery mode. Therefore the jobs picture will remain grim for years to come.
The Fed also believes the economy will contract this year between 0.5 and 1.3 percent. The old forecast said the economy could shrink by 0.2 percent or expand by 1.1 percent. The last time the economy registered a contraction for a full year was in 1991, by 0.2 percent. If the Fed's new predictions prove correct, it would mark the weakest showing since a 1.9 percent drop in 1982, when the country had suffered through a severe recession.
Fed officials do predict that the economy should pick up speed in 2011, growing by as much as 5 percent, which would be considered robust, though I again say they are being optimistic.
Obama Announces Plan To Keep Millions From Losing Homes
In a very bold announcement President Barack Obama laid out his $75 billion plan to tackle
the housing crisis. Calling it "a crisis unlike any we've ever known" in home foreclosures, he said his plan is necessary to help save the economy.
President Obama cautioned that the plan will not save every home but that he believes it will prevent "the worst consequences of this crisis from wreaking even greater havoc on the economy."
His final message:
As a person with a mortgage teetering on the edge of going underwater, I really hope his plan works.
the housing crisis. Calling it "a crisis unlike any we've ever known" in home foreclosures, he said his plan is necessary to help save the economy.
"In the end, all of us are paying a price for this home mortgage crisis."
"And all of us will pay an even steeper price if we allow this crisis to deepen."
President Obama unveiled the plan while in Arizona, which has been particularly hard-hit by the housing crunch. The plan he outlined is much more expensive than many experts had expected. The goal of this plan aims to keep 9 million people from losing their homes. While discussing the plan as a broad strategy, and what it will mean for the economy, the President took great care not to miss the pain that the housing problems are causing for individual families.
"The American Dream is being tested by a home mortgage crisis that not only threatens the stability of our economy but also the stability of families and neighborhoods. While this crisis is vast, it begins just one house and one family at a time."One part will ease refinancing for people who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are currently worth. Another provides incentives for mortgage lenders to help those on the verge of foreclosure.
President Obama cautioned that the plan will not save every home but that he believes it will prevent "the worst consequences of this crisis from wreaking even greater havoc on the economy."
His final message:
"The plan I'm announcing focuses on rescuing families who have played by the
rules and acted responsibly. It will not rescue the unscrupulous or
irresponsible by throwing good taxpayer money after bad loans."
As a person with a mortgage teetering on the edge of going underwater, I really hope his plan works.
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Geithner's Plan Falls Flat
Yesterday Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner presented the Obama’s administration’s Financial Stability Plan to deal with the financial system’s toxic asset overhang and ease, if not reverse, the ongoing decline in bank lending to households and corporations.
To say that it went over like a lead balloon would be an understatement.
Out of the three broad strategies that most economists say are available - nationalization, ‘good / bad bank’, backstop guarantee on ring-fenced toxic assets - the administration plan offers elements of all three.
I am always wary of a plan that offers a little bit of everything.
Geithner’s first program involves a mandatory ‘stress test’ for all banks with $100bn-plus assets which should also shed some clarity on the individual banks exposures and valuations of toxic assets. This I like because there is still too much we do not know about the financial crisis. A major part of this whole economic meltdown has been fear of the unknown. Safe investments and secure loans have been damaged by fear of toxic assets.
According to the plan Geithner laid out yesterday, after the stress test the Treasury’s Capital Assistance Program would stand ready with preferred shares / warrants injections where needed, only this time with clear lending requirements and strict limits on dividends, stock repurchases and acquisitions next to a $500,000 compensation cap. This solves some of the problems with the original $350 billion that Paulson injected into the financial markets late last year.
Geithner claims that any capital investments made by Treasury under the CAP would be placed in the Financial Stability Trust. However, Geithner left unclear what other options are there for institutions that are severely undercapitalized or fail to attract public capital on a recurring basis (Bank of America and Citigroup are two examples) Yes the program aims at ensuring that there is full transparency disclosing all relevant information on capital recipients at www.FinancialStability.gov; but is that enough to give Geithner our trust?
The second program Geithner spoke about was the Public-Private Investment Fund (PPP). This program aims at setting up a new lending/guarantee facility (the so called Bad Bank solution). This program would work by leveraging an initial private capital commitment with government funds to an initial scale of up to $500 billion (and if you look at the fine print it can be expanded to a maximum of $1 trillion.) The aim of this idea is to involve private capital on a large scale that sits currently on the sidelines while also allowing private market forces to determine the price for currently troubled and illiquid assets.
Personally I think yesterday’s tanking of the Dow was because Geithner mentioned using private capitol in his plan.
A similar experiment was tried before with the private sector sponsored M-LEC vehicle that ultimately proved unviable due to asymmetric toxic asset exposures of participating banks and due to still unresolved asset valuation issues. Commentators agree that for a similar plan to work this time, the government will have to assume a potentially substantial downside in order to induce otherwise unwilling investors to participate in view of the size of potential losses.
Renowned distressed debt experts such as Edward Altman and Martin Fridson note that the best time to invest in distressed debt is when default rates peak. Mind that high-yield default rates are set to rise to 15-20% sometime in 2010 from currently 4-5% due to very bad credit quality at the outset of the cycle.
Yet this again is putting all the risk on the public and all the reward for those who got us in this message.
The third program put forth by Secretary Geithner is an expanded version of the previously $200bn Federal Reserve Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program aimed at unclogging the markets for auto, student and other consumer loans. That initiative may expand to as much as $1 trillion, using $100 billion from the Treasury's rescue funds, and include aid for commercial real estate markets.
Geithner points out that securitization created about 40% of the demand for new loans extended to consumers, students, and auto buyers. The decline of securitized lending to the tune of $1.2 trillion between 2006 and 2008 leaves a hole that needs to be filled if a severe lending contraction should be prevented.
Economist Nouriel Roubini in his latest writing It Is Time to Nationalize Insolvent Banking Systems argues that, ultimately, nationalization may be a more market friendly solution of a banking crisis: it creates the biggest hit for common and preferred shareholders of clearly insolvent institutions and – possibly – even the unsecured creditors in case the bank insolvency is too large; it provides a fair upside to the tax-payer. Moreover, it bypasses the asset valuation issue as any overpayment goes back into taxpayers pockets. “With the government starting stress tests to figure out which institutions are so massively undercapitalized that they need to be taken over by the FDIC the administration is putting in place the steps for the eventual and necessary takeover of the insolvent banks.” This might well explain some of the negative market reaction.
The Treasury has stressed that while the ongoing price correction will stimulate home demand, there is a need to reduce foreclosures, which otherwise adding to the excess overhang of homes pose the risk of price over-correction, pushing more homeowners into negative equity. The Treasury plans to announce a Housing Program in the next few weeks to help refinance mortgages and contain foreclosures by reducing monthly payments for homeowners. The program will be financed by using $50 billion from the remaining TARP funds. To increase lender participation, the plan makes it compulsory for banks using government funds under the Financial Stability Plan to participate in foreclosure mitigation. In order to stimulate home demand and help the current homeowners refinance, the Treasury and Fed will continue with their November 2008 plans use $600 billion to buy MBSs and debt of the GSEs using and reduce mortgage rates to the 4-4.5% range. More importantly, the plan will increase flexibility to modify loans under the Hope Now and FHA Programs started in 2007-08 to help increase participation and foreclosure prevention.
Efforts to stimulate demand reducing mortgage rates and offering tax incentives will be largely ineffective as they are a small factor in determining home demand relative to factors such as tighter lending standards, changing dynamics for households - job and income loss, wealth erosion, rising savings rate, and low expectations of income or asset appreciation. These factors will constrain home demand in the short run while potential buyers await further price correction and banks don’t see the viability in offering mortgage for a house whose value is expected to fall.
As a result, the government needs to focus on the supply side of the market by refinancing at-risk mortgages and preventing foreclosures that will only add to the existing overhang of houses. Moreover, government’s loan modification program should reduce mortgage principal rather than just reducing the mortgage rate or extending the loan maturity, which has been the case in past government programs. Unless the problem of insolvency among a large number of households is addressed, default on modified mortgages will also continue. Also, given the large number of homeowners with negative home equity, the program will need much larger funds - over $600 billion to $1 trillion though the actual cost might be much less, since the government will receive a share from future home appreciation. Monetary incentives for servicers are also low and ineffective. Even the number of homeowners the program plans to target, 1.5-2 million is a very small fraction of the over 12 million homeowners with negative equity. In fact, several Democrats are pushing a legislation to allow bankruptcy judges to change mortgage terms that would allow lenders to reduce the mortgage principal for primary homes and bring down monthly payments. To increase participation, they support offering monetary incentives for servicers while lenders will be entitled to a share if the homeowner sells the house and also have the government share any losses on the modified mortgage.
Looking at the shortcomings of past government programs such as the Hope Now, Housing Retention and FDIC programs, the new program should be mandatory for lenders in order to increase participation.
The government will also need to share the cost of modifying the loan, by matching the principal or the interest rate cut in a proportionate or less than proportionate amount. By guaranteeing the loans, the government will be the senior debt holder. The new interest rate should be based on the risk assessment of the borrower and all three parties – homeowner, lenders and servicers, and the government should share the cost of modification. However, determining the extent of principal reduction based on the true value of the house, and dealing with second lien mortgages and the diverging interests of mortgage servicers will be challenging.
Under the new guidelines for compensation issued by the Treasury, firms receiving federal aid will be subject to shareholder say on pay and will be required to cap executive compensation at $500,000 with any additional compensation given out in restricted stocks which can be cashed only after the government has been repaid or the bank has satisfied repayment obligations, and met lending and stability standards. Moreover, bonuses and compensation for other top executives will also be reduced. At the very least the Treasury is going to require disclosure of the compensation structure and strategy, and expenditure on luxury items. Still, while the government's intervention is warranted, the compensation reform being put forward does little to align risks with rewards. Sadly reports are that Geithner fought for real compensation reform.
A large share of the compensation can and will be given out in restricted stocks including compensation for several traders and funds managers who are not under the lenses of the current plan. These measures also give a green light to those who have already received large compensation and severance packages at the troubled banks. More importantly, the measures might act a disincentive in attracting credible executive talent to these troubled institutions in the future who can help deal with the bank losses and overhaul. Wall Street compensation is determined in a competitive market with CEOs joining a firm offering the most attractive pay packages and perks. Many banks are already reluctant to seek capital injection from the Treasury or are contemplating to payback past borrowings in order to avoid government scrutiny over their compensation packages. There is too much voluntary action on the part of the banks. The government needs to be much more forceful. These companies caused the financial crisis, and should not have the luxery of choosing to take part in this package.
To reduce excessive risk-taking in the short-run, compensation, bonuses and even severance packages should be based on the long-term performance of the employee relative to the risk undertaken with large part of the payments given out in restricted stocks that can be redeemed over a longer period of time.
To say that it went over like a lead balloon would be an understatement.
Out of the three broad strategies that most economists say are available - nationalization, ‘good / bad bank’, backstop guarantee on ring-fenced toxic assets - the administration plan offers elements of all three.
I am always wary of a plan that offers a little bit of everything.
Geithner’s first program involves a mandatory ‘stress test’ for all banks with $100bn-plus assets which should also shed some clarity on the individual banks exposures and valuations of toxic assets. This I like because there is still too much we do not know about the financial crisis. A major part of this whole economic meltdown has been fear of the unknown. Safe investments and secure loans have been damaged by fear of toxic assets.
According to the plan Geithner laid out yesterday, after the stress test the Treasury’s Capital Assistance Program would stand ready with preferred shares / warrants injections where needed, only this time with clear lending requirements and strict limits on dividends, stock repurchases and acquisitions next to a $500,000 compensation cap. This solves some of the problems with the original $350 billion that Paulson injected into the financial markets late last year.
Geithner claims that any capital investments made by Treasury under the CAP would be placed in the Financial Stability Trust. However, Geithner left unclear what other options are there for institutions that are severely undercapitalized or fail to attract public capital on a recurring basis (Bank of America and Citigroup are two examples) Yes the program aims at ensuring that there is full transparency disclosing all relevant information on capital recipients at www.FinancialStability.gov; but is that enough to give Geithner our trust?
The second program Geithner spoke about was the Public-Private Investment Fund (PPP). This program aims at setting up a new lending/guarantee facility (the so called Bad Bank solution). This program would work by leveraging an initial private capital commitment with government funds to an initial scale of up to $500 billion (and if you look at the fine print it can be expanded to a maximum of $1 trillion.) The aim of this idea is to involve private capital on a large scale that sits currently on the sidelines while also allowing private market forces to determine the price for currently troubled and illiquid assets.
Personally I think yesterday’s tanking of the Dow was because Geithner mentioned using private capitol in his plan.
A similar experiment was tried before with the private sector sponsored M-LEC vehicle that ultimately proved unviable due to asymmetric toxic asset exposures of participating banks and due to still unresolved asset valuation issues. Commentators agree that for a similar plan to work this time, the government will have to assume a potentially substantial downside in order to induce otherwise unwilling investors to participate in view of the size of potential losses.
Renowned distressed debt experts such as Edward Altman and Martin Fridson note that the best time to invest in distressed debt is when default rates peak. Mind that high-yield default rates are set to rise to 15-20% sometime in 2010 from currently 4-5% due to very bad credit quality at the outset of the cycle.
Yet this again is putting all the risk on the public and all the reward for those who got us in this message.
The third program put forth by Secretary Geithner is an expanded version of the previously $200bn Federal Reserve Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) program aimed at unclogging the markets for auto, student and other consumer loans. That initiative may expand to as much as $1 trillion, using $100 billion from the Treasury's rescue funds, and include aid for commercial real estate markets.
Geithner points out that securitization created about 40% of the demand for new loans extended to consumers, students, and auto buyers. The decline of securitized lending to the tune of $1.2 trillion between 2006 and 2008 leaves a hole that needs to be filled if a severe lending contraction should be prevented.
Economist Nouriel Roubini in his latest writing It Is Time to Nationalize Insolvent Banking Systems argues that, ultimately, nationalization may be a more market friendly solution of a banking crisis: it creates the biggest hit for common and preferred shareholders of clearly insolvent institutions and – possibly – even the unsecured creditors in case the bank insolvency is too large; it provides a fair upside to the tax-payer. Moreover, it bypasses the asset valuation issue as any overpayment goes back into taxpayers pockets. “With the government starting stress tests to figure out which institutions are so massively undercapitalized that they need to be taken over by the FDIC the administration is putting in place the steps for the eventual and necessary takeover of the insolvent banks.” This might well explain some of the negative market reaction.
The Treasury has stressed that while the ongoing price correction will stimulate home demand, there is a need to reduce foreclosures, which otherwise adding to the excess overhang of homes pose the risk of price over-correction, pushing more homeowners into negative equity. The Treasury plans to announce a Housing Program in the next few weeks to help refinance mortgages and contain foreclosures by reducing monthly payments for homeowners. The program will be financed by using $50 billion from the remaining TARP funds. To increase lender participation, the plan makes it compulsory for banks using government funds under the Financial Stability Plan to participate in foreclosure mitigation. In order to stimulate home demand and help the current homeowners refinance, the Treasury and Fed will continue with their November 2008 plans use $600 billion to buy MBSs and debt of the GSEs using and reduce mortgage rates to the 4-4.5% range. More importantly, the plan will increase flexibility to modify loans under the Hope Now and FHA Programs started in 2007-08 to help increase participation and foreclosure prevention.
Efforts to stimulate demand reducing mortgage rates and offering tax incentives will be largely ineffective as they are a small factor in determining home demand relative to factors such as tighter lending standards, changing dynamics for households - job and income loss, wealth erosion, rising savings rate, and low expectations of income or asset appreciation. These factors will constrain home demand in the short run while potential buyers await further price correction and banks don’t see the viability in offering mortgage for a house whose value is expected to fall.
As a result, the government needs to focus on the supply side of the market by refinancing at-risk mortgages and preventing foreclosures that will only add to the existing overhang of houses. Moreover, government’s loan modification program should reduce mortgage principal rather than just reducing the mortgage rate or extending the loan maturity, which has been the case in past government programs. Unless the problem of insolvency among a large number of households is addressed, default on modified mortgages will also continue. Also, given the large number of homeowners with negative home equity, the program will need much larger funds - over $600 billion to $1 trillion though the actual cost might be much less, since the government will receive a share from future home appreciation. Monetary incentives for servicers are also low and ineffective. Even the number of homeowners the program plans to target, 1.5-2 million is a very small fraction of the over 12 million homeowners with negative equity. In fact, several Democrats are pushing a legislation to allow bankruptcy judges to change mortgage terms that would allow lenders to reduce the mortgage principal for primary homes and bring down monthly payments. To increase participation, they support offering monetary incentives for servicers while lenders will be entitled to a share if the homeowner sells the house and also have the government share any losses on the modified mortgage.
Looking at the shortcomings of past government programs such as the Hope Now, Housing Retention and FDIC programs, the new program should be mandatory for lenders in order to increase participation.
The government will also need to share the cost of modifying the loan, by matching the principal or the interest rate cut in a proportionate or less than proportionate amount. By guaranteeing the loans, the government will be the senior debt holder. The new interest rate should be based on the risk assessment of the borrower and all three parties – homeowner, lenders and servicers, and the government should share the cost of modification. However, determining the extent of principal reduction based on the true value of the house, and dealing with second lien mortgages and the diverging interests of mortgage servicers will be challenging.
Under the new guidelines for compensation issued by the Treasury, firms receiving federal aid will be subject to shareholder say on pay and will be required to cap executive compensation at $500,000 with any additional compensation given out in restricted stocks which can be cashed only after the government has been repaid or the bank has satisfied repayment obligations, and met lending and stability standards. Moreover, bonuses and compensation for other top executives will also be reduced. At the very least the Treasury is going to require disclosure of the compensation structure and strategy, and expenditure on luxury items. Still, while the government's intervention is warranted, the compensation reform being put forward does little to align risks with rewards. Sadly reports are that Geithner fought for real compensation reform.
A large share of the compensation can and will be given out in restricted stocks including compensation for several traders and funds managers who are not under the lenses of the current plan. These measures also give a green light to those who have already received large compensation and severance packages at the troubled banks. More importantly, the measures might act a disincentive in attracting credible executive talent to these troubled institutions in the future who can help deal with the bank losses and overhaul. Wall Street compensation is determined in a competitive market with CEOs joining a firm offering the most attractive pay packages and perks. Many banks are already reluctant to seek capital injection from the Treasury or are contemplating to payback past borrowings in order to avoid government scrutiny over their compensation packages. There is too much voluntary action on the part of the banks. The government needs to be much more forceful. These companies caused the financial crisis, and should not have the luxery of choosing to take part in this package.
To reduce excessive risk-taking in the short-run, compensation, bonuses and even severance packages should be based on the long-term performance of the employee relative to the risk undertaken with large part of the payments given out in restricted stocks that can be redeemed over a longer period of time.
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Roubini: US Banking System is Insolvent
Nouriel Roubini, of RGE Monitor, was one of the first people to predict the housing crisis, and now he has come out and said that "the US Banking System is Insolvent." While at Davos Nouriel Roubini said he believes this because expected losses for the US banking system will be about $2 trillion, which far exceeds bank capital of about $1.5 trillion. Roubini has also said that he believes total financial system losses could hit $3.6 trillion.
Because of this fact Roubini does not believe the government plan for buying the toxic assets of US banks may not work.
Instead Nouriel Roubini suggests that the Obama administration should look towards Sweden's plan of nationalizing all insolvent banks, cleaning them up and then selling off the good assets to the private sector.
I can just hear the Republicans howling now.
Because of this fact Roubini does not believe the government plan for buying the toxic assets of US banks may not work.
Instead Nouriel Roubini suggests that the Obama administration should look towards Sweden's plan of nationalizing all insolvent banks, cleaning them up and then selling off the good assets to the private sector.
I can just hear the Republicans howling now.
Thursday, January 08, 2009
A bad situation could become dramatically worse
Obama is delivering a major address on the economy today. It is, of course, about the economy and the need for immediate action.
The transition team e-mailed excerpts of the speech:
The transition team e-mailed excerpts of the speech:
I don’t believe it’s too late to change course, but it will be if we don’t take dramatic action as soon as possible. If nothing is done, this recession could linger for years. The unemployment rate could reach double digits. Our economy could fall $1 trillion short of its full capacity, which translates into more than $12,000 in lost income for a family of four. We could lose a generation of potential and promise, as more young Americans are forced to forgo dreams of college or the chance to train for the jobs of the future. And our nation could lose the competitive edge that has served as a foundation for our strength and standing in the world.In short, a bad situation could become dramatically worse....
There is no doubt that the cost of this plan will be considerable. It will certainly add to the budget deficit in the short-term. But equally certain are the consequences of doing too little or nothing at all, for that will lead to an even greater deficit of jobs, incomes, and confidence in our economy.
Wednesday, January 07, 2009
Another Rough Day on Wall Street,
It was another rough day on Wall Street, with the Dow falling 245 points, the other major indexes down about 3% each.
Wednesday, December 24, 2008
IMF's top economist warns of another Great Depression
John Aravosis over at Americablog has a really interesting post about a warning made by the IMF's top economist.
AFP
John Aravosis writes about this news, and there were some interesting points he makes about the original Le Monde article.
AFP
The IMF's top economist, Olivier Blanchard, maintained that governments around the world should boost domestic demand in order to avoid another Great Depression similar to the global downturn that shook the world in the 1930s."Consumer and business confidence indexes have never fallen so far since they began. The coming months will be very bad," Blanchard said in an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde."
It is imperative to stifle this loss of confidence, to restart household consumption, if we want to prevent this recession developing into a Great Depression," he added.
John Aravosis writes about this news, and there were some interesting points he makes about the original Le Monde article.
Actually, I found the article in Le Monde, and I think the economist was even more vehement than the AFP translation. I'm also not convinced that AFP totally explained what the economist was suggesting - he wasn't just saying that we need to restart consumer demand, he was saying that governments have to consider boosting their own spending to REPLACE consumer demand, if necessary, even if it leads to larger deficits.
Here is what Le Monde says:
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, le directeur général du FMI, pousse les gouvernements à multiplier les dépenses budgétaires pour soutenir la croissance. Or, le Fonds était un grand ennemi des déficits.Pourquoi ce revirement?
Nous sommes en présence d'une crise d'une amplitude exceptionnelle, dont la principale composante est un effondrement de la demande. Les indices de confiance des consommateurs et des entreprises n'ont jamais autant chuté depuis qu'ils existent. Du jamais-vu !...Les mois qui viennent vont être très mauvais. Il est impératif de juguler cette perte de confiance, de relancer et, si nécessaire, de remplacer la demande privée, si l'on veut éviter que la récession ne se transforme en Grande Dépression. Bien sûr, en temps normal, nous aurions recommandé à l'Europe de diminuer ces déficits. Mais nous ne sommes pas en temps normal.
What the economist appears to be saying is that governments need to consider REPLACING the loss of consumer spending with GOVERNMENT spending, if necessary, regardless of whether it leads to deficits.
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the head of the IMF, is pushing governments to increase their own spending in order to support growth. The IMF has always been a big enemy of deficits. Why the reversal?We are facing a crisis of an exceptional breadth, the basis of which is a collapse of demand. The consumer and business confidence numbers have never fallen this much since they've first been recorded. We've NEVER seen this!...
It is imperative to curb the this loss of confidence, to relaunch it and, if necessary, replace private demand, if we want to avoid a recession that turns into a Great Depression. Of course, in normal times, we would recommend that Europe reduce its budget deficits. But these are not normal times.
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