Paul Krugman: The Big Dither

Paul Krugman writes today in the New York Times about the need to fix America’s banks. Professor Krugman asks the question if President Obama is being bold enough, or is he and his administration dithering too much?

I do think that Obama has been slow in the steps that are necessary to fix the banking mess, but I do wonder if the President is constrained by politics, and the need to keep the markets some what calm. I think Krugman brings up great points, and as an academic and a pundit Professor Krugman provides a strong progressive argument. It is not his job to worry about the politics, but to suggest the best course from an economic sense.

The Big Dither
By PAUL KRUGMAN

Last month, in his big speech to Congress, President Obama argued for bold steps to fix America’s dysfunctional banks. “While the cost of action will be great,” he declared, “I can assure you that the cost of inaction will be far greater, for it could result in an economy that sputters along for not months or years, but perhaps a decade.”

Many analysts agree. But among people I talk to there’s a growing sense of frustration, even panic, over Mr. Obama’s failure to match his words with deeds. The reality is that when it comes to dealing with the banks, the Obama administration is dithering. Policy is stuck in a holding pattern.

Here’s how the pattern works: first, administration officials, usually speaking off the record, float a plan for rescuing the banks in the press. This trial balloon is quickly shot down by informed commentators.

Then, a few weeks later, the administration floats a new plan. This plan is, however, just a thinly disguised version of the previous plan, a fact quickly realized by all concerned. And the cycle starts again.

Why do officials keep offering plans that nobody else finds credible? Because somehow, top officials in the Obama administration and at the Federal Reserve have convinced themselves that troubled assets, often referred to these days as “toxic waste,” are really worth much more than anyone is actually willing to pay for them — and that if these assets were properly priced, all our troubles would go away.
Thus, in a recent interview Tim Geithner, the Treasury secretary, tried to make a distinction between the “basic inherent economic value” of troubled assets and the “artificially depressed value” that those assets command right now. In recent transactions, even AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities have sold for less than 40 cents on the dollar, but Mr. Geithner seems to think they’re worth much, much more.
And the government’s job, he declared, is to “provide the financing to help get those markets working,” pushing the price of toxic waste up to where it ought to be.
What’s more, officials seem to believe that getting toxic waste properly priced would cure the ills of all our major financial institutions. Earlier this week, Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, was asked about the problem of “zombies” — financial institutions that are effectively bankrupt but are being kept alive by government aid. “I don’t know of any large zombie institutions in the U.S. financial system,” he declared, and went on to specifically deny that A.I.G. — A.I.G.! — is a zombie.
This is the same A.I.G. that, unable to honor its promises to pay off other financial institutions when bonds default, has already received $150 billion in aid and just got a commitment for $30 billion more.

The truth is that the Bernanke-Geithner plan — the plan the administration keeps floating, in slightly different versions — isn’t going to fly.

Take the plan’s latest incarnation: a proposal to make low-interest loans to private investors willing to buy up troubled assets. This would certainly drive up the price of toxic waste because it would offer a heads-you-win, tails-we-lose proposition. As described, the plan would let investors profit if asset prices went up but just walk away if prices fell substantially.

But would it be enough to make the banking system healthy? No.

Think of it this way: by using taxpayer funds to subsidize the prices of toxic waste, the administration would shower benefits on everyone who made the mistake of buying the stuff. Some of those benefits would trickle down to where they’re needed, shoring up the balance sheets of key financial institutions. But most of the benefit would go to people who don’t need or deserve to be rescued.

And this means that the government would have to lay out trillions of dollars to bring the financial system back to health, which would, in turn, both ensure a fierce public outcry and add to already serious concerns about the deficit. (Yes, even strong advocates of fiscal stimulus like yours truly worry about red ink.) Realistically, it’s just not going to happen.

So why has this zombie idea — it keeps being killed, but it keeps coming back — taken such a powerful grip? The answer, I fear, is that officials still aren’t willing to face the facts. They don’t want to face up to the dire state of major financial institutions because it’s very hard to rescue an essentially insolvent bank without, at least temporarily, taking it over. And temporary nationalization is still, apparently, considered unthinkable.

But this refusal to face the facts means, in practice, an absence of action. And I share the president’s fears: inaction could result in an economy that sputters along, not for months or years, but for a decade or more.

The truth is the Bernanke-Geithner plan will not work and I hope President Obama soon realizes this, and makes the changes that are necessary to fix this country.

Bankers Don't Care About the Banks

I am a huge fan of the Young Turks and wanted to point out this must-read piece that their host Cenk Uygar wrote:

Tim Geithner and Larry Summers and many others are missing the fundamental flaw in the system. The bankers don't care about the banks; they care about the
bankers.

These days, the way executives make money instead is in the form of bonuses for years where they bring in a lot of return (and often times for years they don't), but the threat of being fired for too much risk taking is minimal. The more risk you take, the more money everyone makes. And it's not the partner's money you're playing with anymore. You're playing with house money. No one is minding the store anymore.

So, now we have Tim Geithner and the rest of Treasury working so hard to prop up not just these failed banks - but these failed bank executives - because we don't want government running these large companies. The self-interest of the market will do a better job of managing these companies. But it hasn't - because of this fundamental flaw.

These executives did not actually fail. They succeeded wildly. It's just that they had a different goal - to take home as much money as they possibly could for themselves. Mission accomplished!

The Treasury plan is all wrong. We have to first acknowledge that the boards of these companies are not truly representing the shareholders. They are largely friends with most of the CEOs and they do not have an incentive to reign in out of control compensation for the top executives. Then those CEOs pass on the wrong incentives to the executives below them. The more risk they all take, the more money they take home. And if their company goes broke one day - who cares?

Most of these guys took home millions upon millions of dollars already for profits that never really existed. If the company goes under, okay the gravy train came to an end but they still have all the money they made from all those years. It's in their personal bank accounts. That's enlightened self-interest!

Do you know that last year, as Merrill Lynch was in its death throes, 696 executives got bonuses over a million dollars? 696! As the company lost tens of billions of dollars, the executives took home a combined $3.6 billion that year. Billions in bonuses in the worst year in the company's history. They're not stupid; they're smart. They're looting the store before the cops show up.

This is the financial equivalent of the federal government not showing up to rescue people after Hurricane Katrina. Last year the five biggest Wall Street securities firms lost $25.3 billion. The executives at those companies still took home $26 billion in bonuses. In other words, they wouldn't have lost a nickel if they hadn't taken any bonuses.

The Treasury Department still hasn't shown up to take over these looted stores. In fact, they keep pouring taxpayer money into these same shops, as the money continues to move out the back door. Tim Geithner is the worst sheriff in the world.
But we already knew that. Because the main guy who was overseeing all of these banks in New York, as they took these giants risks, was the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York - Tim Geithner.

He is under the misimpression that his job is to protect the sanctity of the banks.
Not only is that not his job, but that is working against his actual goal. His real job is to stabilize the financial system, with or without these particular banks or bank executives. The longer he keeps these guys in charge, the longer the looting continues.

Should The US Consider Nationalizing Banks That Are In Trouble

Professor Nouriel Roubini of Global EconoMonitor, who is also known as Dr. Doom (because he for years was warning of the on-coming financial crisis) has given several interviews over the lasy week to Business New Europe, Charlie Rose, Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, Reuters, ABC, NBR and CNBC.

In his CNBC interview, he strongly advocates a Swedish-style bank nationalization to repair the ailing financial system and prevent banks from turning into 'zombie banks' like were in Japan.

"If you don't nationalize them on a temporary basis the fiscal commitments will be bigger. The alternative is actually a dangerous debt spiral.”

The Swedish-style bank nationalization is where the government of Sweden in 1992 had to deal with the collapse of a real estate bubble and had to take control of two of that country's largest banks, Nordbanken and Gota. The government stripped the banks of their bad assets, which it kept in a pair of new companies known as "bad banks." The remnant "good banks" were then merged into a single company and launched back into the marketplace.

Even Conservatives like Alan Greenspan and Senator Graham have publicly suggested that the idea of nationalization may be needed. Professor Roubini has pointed to this in a number of interviews like the one he had with Tunku Varadarajan in Wall Street Journal.

The biggest barrier to nationalization is the negative public image as 'Bolshevik' rather than 'pragmatic.' But this is stupid, and the result of idiots like Hannerty, Limbaugh, and Republican politicians who toss out accusations of socialism and communism without consideration. Nationalizing troubled banks would allow the government to take distressed assets without having to set a price.

For those who are scared of the word 'nationalization' you should consider the example of IndyMac, a bank that was nationalized and quickly re-privatized in less than a year. IndyMac was an example of a company that needed to be seized.

During a discussion of the banking crisis on ABC's This Week with George Stephonopilis that featured Professor Roubini, Professor Paul Krugman and George Will, and they discussed a temporary nationalization. Professor Krugman suggested calling nationalization “pre-privatization” to sugarcoat the program. Krugman also points out that in 2009 we have already nationalized 14 banks. Similarily the Federal government took control of mortgage finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in early September of 2008.

Administration officials say they are determined to maintain the appearance, and in important respects the reality, that banks remain under private ownership. I do not agree with this, the current leadership of these banks are the major problem. The Obama administration argues that they have a responsibility to pursue the least costly solution, and that they continue to believe smaller steps than nationalization can resolve the crisis. They are wrong.

Another argument against nationilzation is that the U.S. Banking system is larger than Swedens, and while the problem is spread across many of the nation's 8,300 banks, the bulk of the problem is in a concentrated few. Fix these mega banks like Citi and Bank of America and you have taken the largest concentration of troubled assets. Nationalize these mega banks, and break them up, no bank should ever be 'too big to fail.'

No one is arguing that the banks should be nationalized on a permanent basis. Those who are arguing against that are attacking straw men.

Obama and his economic team need to step-up as leaders and whether they call it Nationalization or not (it will most probably be called receivership or conservatorship) and take over those major banks that have dragged the economy down.